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Abstract The integrated assessment model FUND 2.8n is applied in an assessment
to estimate the magnitude of the general market and non-market impacts of temper-
ature changes caused by a possible shutdown of the thermohaline circulation (THC).
The monetized impacts of this change in environmental conditions are determined
for 207 individual countries for two scenarios: one warming scenario in which the
THC weakens but remains intact, and another in which the THC breaks down.
Eight different response patterns are identified. The dominant pattern is that a THC
shutdown has an offsetting effect on the underlying warming trend. Depending on
whether the impacts of warming are initially beneficial or detrimental, the economic
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effects of a THC shutdown show distinct regional variability. Key economic sectors
affected are water resources and energy consumption, as well as cardiovascular and
respiratory diseases among health impacts. The maximum national impact of a shut-
down of the THC turns out to be of the magnitude of a few per cent of GDP, but
the average global impact is much smaller. The results indicate that the temperature
effect of a THC shutdown does not create an insurmountable economic threat on
a global scale, but may cause severe damages to individual countries. However, a
consideration of other climatic impacts such as precipitation and sea level changes is
likely to alter the identified trends in economic development.
1 Introduction
The potential weakening of the thermohaline circulation (THC) due to climate
change has captured the public mind. Often referred to as a collapse of the ocean
conveyer belt that brings warmth to Europe, the public picture is one of an impending
ice-age. Based on more sophisticated analysis, scientists and policy makers worry
about the unprecedented impacts this scenario of climate change would have.
Indeed, the THC can be considered to be one of the tipping elements of the
planet’s climate system (Lenton et al. 2008). Depending on the extent of additional
freshwater input into the North Atlantic, the THC may shift from one stable condi-
tion (THC on) to another (THC off). The rate of freshwater input is important in
determining the effectiveness of bringing the THC to a halt (Stocker and Schmittner
1997). The higher the additional freshwater input, the more readily any mechanisms
stabilizing the THC will be overcome and the circulation breaks down.
Model ensemble simulations of the fate of the THC show that already a small
additional freshwater flux into the North Atlantic leads to a weakening but not
to a complete shutdown of the THC (Stouffer et al. 2006). The response of the
THC to climate change is usually a gradual spin-down (Manabe and Stouffer 1994;
Mikolajewicz et al. 2007). Although it has to be noted that there is a large uncertainty
connected to this quantity, the critical freshwater input necessary for such a shutdown
of the THC is on the order of 0.1 Sv or higher (Kuhlbrodt et al. 2009). Based on
expert opinion, a weakening of the THC as a consequence of global warming is much
more likely to occur than a complete shutdown, even though some of the experts
that were interviewed about their view of the fate of the THC assess the probability
of a complete shutdown in scenarios of a multiplication of the atmospheric CO2
concentration as significantly different from zero (Zickfeld et al. 2007).
A shutdown of the THC would create a substantial cooling over the North
Atlantic. In hosing experiments, in which a large pulse of freshwater is added
to the northern North Atlantic, the reduction of the mean air temperature can
locally exceed 15◦C (Wood et al. 2003, 2006; Vellinga 2004). In addition, the entire
hemisphere is subject to cooling. Model intercomparisons indicate that the pattern of
temperature change as a consequence of a THC shutdown is complex, with cooling
over the western North Atlantic and some warming further east (Stouffer et al. 2006).
However, it has to be noted that if an underlying global warming trend is considered,
this trend dominates any effects of a weakened THC. Consequently, a weakening
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of the THC then only has a slightly offsetting effect on the overall warming (Gregory
et al. 2005).
In addition to temperature changes, altered rainfall patterns can also be observed
(Vellinga and Wood 2002). The Northern Hemisphere is likely to experience reduced
rainfall while the shift of the Intertropical Convergence Zone, which follows a
THC shutdown, leads to sometimes pronounced precipitation increases over South
America and Africa. Concerning the oceans, sea level height is also expected to
be affected. In the North Atlantic region, such changes in hydrographic conditions
would cause an increase in sea level of approximately 25–50 cm (Levermann et al.
2005; Vellinga and Wood 2008). This would augment the effects of global warming
on global sea level height and predominately occurs in the North Atlantic and the
Arctic Seas. Coinciding with the overall rise in sea level is a regional acceleration
of this change in hydrography, which can reach up to 25 mm/a near the American
Atlantic coast in case of a THC shutdown. This effect adds to the environmental
stress by changes in temperature and precipitation.
In an assessment of ecosystem responses to a shutdown of the THC, Higgins and
Vellinga (2004) show that the implications of such a drastic environmental change is
not confined to the region of the North Atlantic, in which the change in THC strength
actually takes place. Through particular teleconnections, the ecological impacts are
likely to occur globally and are quite heterogeneously distributed geographically.
Such ecological impacts are not only driven by changes in temperature but also by
changes in precipitation patterns, on which changes in net primary productivity are
predominantly dependent.
Among the most pronounced ecological consequences of northern hemisphere
cooling following a shutdown of the THC is a southward shift of the forest line and
a change of temperate biome distribution (Köhler et al. 2005), which in turn has
implications on agricultural production as well. Model results indicate that forests are
likely to expand in regions that experience increases in precipitation such as eastern
South America while growth of deserts and biome losses will occur in regions like
the Sahel that would receive less precipitation (Higgins and Vellinga 2004). While
changes of terrestrial carbon storage are expected to be small (Köhler et al. 2005), the
overall production of terrestrial vegetation is expected to decline slightly (Vellinga
and Wood 2002). The resulting effect on the atmospheric CO2 content is, however,
hard to predict, as it is critically dependent on the underlying climatic conditions
when the THC shuts down (Köhler et al. 2005).
In an analysis of possible economic implications of a shutdown of the THC,
Nævdal and Oppenheimer (2007) define a model that considers several possible
thresholds for THC change and assess the optimal regulation of CO2 emissions
to possibly prevent a THC shutdown. Results indicate that in order to avoid a
“catastrophic” risk of a THC shutdown, specific acceptable values of temperature
and temperature increase may not be exceeded. However, in the model simulations
only the maximum acceptable rate of temperature increase was surpassed in finite
time while the threshold with regard to temperature itself was never reached. Keller
and others (2004) assess abatement policies to prevent a collapse of the THC in the
context of uncertainty and show that the influence of incomplete knowledge on the
optimal CO2 abatement strategy is critically dependent on the importance given to
ecological and economic investment irreversibilities.
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The assessment of economic consequences of a THC shutdown in this paper
focuses on the impacts of temperature changes. Obviously, there are economic
impacts arising from altered precipitation patterns and sea level rise as well. So far,
assessments of such effects have always been conducted without considering changes
in THC strength.
Changes in precipitation patterns directly influence agricultural production
(Fischer et al. 2005). A global assessment indicates that climate change has little
impact on agricultural cereal production at a global scale. However, a regional dif-
ferentiation shows that some regions can be significantly affected, with the most
severe changes occurring in tropical semi-arid developing countries.
Sea level changes affect coastal zones in all regions of the world. An analysis
with a CGE model of the economy-wide impacts of a sea level rise of 25 cm until
the year 2050 shows that neglecting coastal protection leads to land losses that have
detrimental implications for the entire economy (Bosello et al. 2007). Furthermore,
public utility is also negatively affected. In contrast, full coastal protection would
lead to regional increases in GDP. It has to be noted, though, that the geographic
distribution of sea level rise following a THC shutdown differs substantially from a
general increase in sea level of 25 cm worldwide. An application of FUND, which
looks at the economic impacts of sea level changes following a catastrophic event
like the collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet, shows that there would be a
magnification of the effects of sea level rise on the world’s coasts by an order of
magnitude due to rapidly rising costs for coastal protection and very high damages
stemming from land losses and forced migration (Nicholls et al. 2008; Tol 2009).
Fankhauser and Tol (2005) draw attention to the fact that direct market and non-
market impacts of climate change are not the only economic consequences of altered
environmental conditions. Long-term effects include changes in people’s willingness
to save, capital accumulation, and technological progress. Climate change impacts
on capital and savings are generally negative, thus disregarding these quantities in
climate change assessments causes impacts to be underestimated.
In this paper, we estimate the general magnitude of monetized market and non-
market impacts of temperature changes induced by a shutdown of the THC. This
extends the assessments of Link and Tol (2004) and Ceronsky et al. (2005). In
Link and Tol (2004), we use FUND 2.7 to estimate total impacts and compare two
scenarios: one without and one with a THC shutdown. These two scenarios are
superimposed on a global warming scenario generated with the earth system model
of intermediate complexity CLIMBER-2 (Rahmstorf and Ganopolski 1999) that is
based on the IPCC IS92e scenario (Houghton et al. 1995). No sensitivity analysis was
reported, indeed done. In Ceronsky et al. (2005), FUND 2.8 was used to estimate
marginal impacts. The THC scenario applied is but one in a whole range of extreme
climate scenarios. Both papers conclude that a THC shutdown is not dramatic;
it may even be locally beneficial as warming slows down but does not turn into
cooling, which would e.g. enhance agricultural production in large parts of Europe
(Kuhlbrodt et al. 2009). However, they have the distinct disadvantage that the spatial
resolution is crude. Iceland, Ireland, and Norway, the countries most at risk of a
THC shutdown, are grouped with Western Europe. When Iceland and Greece are
averaged, any effects get lost in the aggregation. In the current paper, we use FUND
2.8, but study each country separately.
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2 The model
The FUND model has been used for many purposes, but its main strength has always
been the impacts of climate change. Earlier versions had 9 regions, and later versions
16. In this paper, we discard most of the model, and only retain the impact module.
This part, however, is reparameterized for 207 countries. The impact module of
FUND 2.8 is described extensively in Tol (2002a, b).1 However, the data presented
in those studies were aggregated to a regional level. For some impacts, this was just a
summation of country-based data. For other impacts, only regional information was
available. We now present the national impacts module of FUND 2.8n. The source
code, in Excel, can be found at www.fnu.zmaw.de/FUND.5679.0.html.
The climate change induced impact on cardiovascular mortality is based on
Martens (1998). Impacts are assumed to vary linearly with the deviation of the
actual temperature in the warmest or coldest month (for heat- and cold-related cases,
respectively) in a given annual period from the temperature that the population is
acclimatized to. This baseline temperature to which people are accustomed is based
on the long-term temperature development in each geographic entity considered. It
increases with warming too, using a geometric update procedure of the temperature,
in which the gap between the temperature that people are used to and the actually
observed temperature decreases by 10% per year. Thus, the impact is more than
linear in the rate of warming.2 Heat- and cold-related cases are modeled separately,
as are effects on people below and above 65 years of age. Heat-related cardiovascular
disorders are assumed to be an urban phenomenon only. Respiratory mortality is
treated in the same way as heat-related cardiovascular disorders, but is not limited to
urban areas.
Schistosomiasis, dengue fever and malaria are assumed to be linearly related to
warming. The vulnerability is based on the 1995 data in WHO (1995). These data
have been used to calibrate FUND and to derive the income elasticities subsequently
used in the assessments. Vulnerability is assumed to decline with per capita income
growth, with an elasticity of 2.65. Diarrhea mortality is more than linear in warming
with a power of 1.14, while vulnerability falls with an income elasticity of 1.58.
Diarrhea morbidity follows the same pattern, but with different parameters: 0.70 for
the climate effect, and 0.42 for the income effect.
For all diseases except diarrhea, morbidity is assumed to be proportional to mor-
tality, using the ratio given in WHO (1995). Mortality is valued at 200 times the
annual per capita income of each deceased, morbidity at 0.8 times the annual per
capita income of the diseased.
Cooling demand is based on Downing et al. (1996), who report regional results
only. Impacts are assumed to be more than linear in warming, with a power of 1.5, and
to increase with economic growth with an elasticity of 0.8. This income elasticity is
1Further information, including publications, technical descriptions, and source codes, can be found
at www.fnu.zmaw.de/FUND.5679.0.html.
2In the regional version of FUND, cardiovascular and respiratory impacts are quadratic in the level
of temperature, but insensitive to the rate of warming. Intraregional variation does not allow for
consistent parameterization with acclimatization.
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used to downscale regional sensitivities to a national level. Heating demand is based
on the same source and follows the same procedure, but the sign is opposite and
it is less than linear in warming with a power of only 0.5. Water resources are also
based on Downing et al. (1996). Impacts are assumed to change linearly with global
warming; the assumed income elasticity is 0.85.
Species loss varies quadratically with the rate of warming. The value of species
loss is logistic in the rate of warming. The maximum amount that people are willing
to pay to prevent climate change-induced species loss is set to be $50 per person
per year for people with the average income in the OECD in 1990. This maximum
is proportional to income, and inversely proportional to the number of remaining
species. So if people become richer, the willingness to pay increases and also if
biodiversity decreases. This applies to all countries, not just those who lie below
the OECD average. Poorer countries approach the maximum willingness to pay for
biodiversity logistically as they grow richer.
The impacts of sea level rise are derived from Hoozemans et al. (1993) and Bijlsma
et al. (1996). There are no more recent global impact studies; see Nicholls and Tol
(2006) for a current review. Without coastal protection, wetland and dry land losses
are assumed to be linearly related to sea level rise. The global mean sea level is
determined by a geometric series depending on temperature that is calibrated based
on the IS92a scenario in Kattenberg et al. (1996). Dry land losses decline linearly
with protection, but wetland losses increase linearly with protection. The costs of dry
land loss change linearly with per capita income and population density. The value of
wetland losses follows the same logic as the value of species loss. Protection costs are
assumed to be constant. The level of protection is set by a cost-benefit analysis, based
on Fankhauser (1994), trading off the benefits of less dry land loss against the costs of
protection and additional wetland loss. Dry land loss induces migration. Relocation
is assumed to occur domestically. The cost of migration is assumed to equal 3.4 times
the per capita income (Tol 1995).
The impacts of climate change on agriculture are based on the rate and level of cli-
mate change and on effects from CO2 fertilization. All are functions of temperature
and are calibrated to Darwin et al. (1995), Fischer et al. (1996), Kane et al. (1992),
and Tsigas et al. (1996). The impacts are split into three parts since there are various
effects of climate and climate change influencing agricultural productivity. The first
part is linearly related to the rate of warming and denotes the impact of the rate of
climate change. These impacts are always negative. The second part is quadratic with
respect to temperature, with an explicit climate optimum for agriculture for each
country. Impacts are positive (negative) if a country moves towards (away from)
its optimum. This denotes the impact of the level of climate change on agriculture,
which assumes that for each country there is an optimal temperature for agriculture
at which production is greatest. The third part is logarithmic in the atmospheric
concentration of carbon dioxide, as CO2 fertilization is generally positive but there
is a tendency for saturation. The national parameters equal the parameters of the
region to which the country belongs in FUND 2.8. However, the climate scenario
analyzed is resolved at country level. Impacts are expressed as fraction of national
agricultural production. The share of agriculture in GDP is country-specific. It falls
with an income elasticity of 0.31.
Climate change impacts on forestry are calibrated to Perez-Garcia et al. (1997)
and Sohngen et al. (2001). Impacts are assumed to vary linearly with warming and
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logarithmically with the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, each with a
weight of one half. Sensitivities decrease with economic growth with an income elas-
ticity of 0.31. This elasticity was used to downscale regional to national sensitivities.
3 Scenarios
The analysis of the impacts of a shutdown of the THC is based on the hosing experi-
ment of Vellinga and Wood (2002), which was conducted using the HadCM3 model
(Gordon et al. 2000), where the THC collapsed after one strong pulse of freshwater
was added. After that, the simulation covered a century in which the THC could
recover to some extent. In our assessment, we determine the difference in average
temperature per country between the HadCM3 hosing scenario and the control run
with stable THC conditions for the time period of the first three decades after the
THC shutdown (Fig. 1). The magnitude of the temperature effect of a THC shutdown
is then placed in context of a warming scenario.
We superimpose the obtained temperature difference on a FUND scenario of
climate change, using a spatial pattern that is calibrated to the HadCM3 model.
The FUND scenario of climate change (Tol 1999) follows the IPCC IS92a scenario
(Leggett et al. 1992) for the economic and demographic development, and the
emissions trajectory of the IS92f scenario. In such scenarios of rising greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere, the THC gradually weakens (Wood et al. 1999;
Vellinga and Wood 2008). In contrast, the THC shuts down rapidly and takes a
long time to recover if scenarios are used that contain applications of large pulses
of freshwater into the North Atlantic. In this assessment, it is therefore plausible to
Fig. 1 The difference of the 2100–2129 average annual temperature between the HadCM3 THC
shutdown scenario and the control scenario
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apply a gradual linear transition between the two states of the THC. It is assumed
that the THC functions until 2070. After that, it slows down. In 2100, the full climate
effect of the THC shutdown is assumed to take hold. Note that the dynamic effect of
a THC shutdown on the sea level is disregarded in this assessment.
4 Results
Starting from present, the simulation extends through the twenty-first century. The
market and non-market impacts of climate change are determined for the year 2100
and related to the initial conditions. Figure 2 shows the impact of the THC shutdown
in 2100. The impact is measured as the difference between the monetized impact of
climate change with and without a THC shutdown. Eight different situations can be
distinguished.
In some places, a THC shutdown implies additional warming (1). If warming is
already negative without a change in THC strength, additional warming is worse,
and a THC shutdown has a negative impact (1N). This is the case in Western Africa.
Figure 3 shows the welfare impacts in Gambia as an example. If warming is generally
positive, additional warming induced by a THC change is even better, and a THC
shutdown has a positive impact (1P). This is the case for Australia and New Zealand
(Fig. 3).
Fig. 2 The effect per country of a shutdown of the thermohaline circulation on the welfare impacts
of climate change in 2100. In the top panels, countries warm faster (left panel) or cool (right panel).
In the bottom panels, countries warm slower. The bottom left panel displays countries that benefit
from a THC shutdown, the bottom right panel countries that are damaged by a THC shutdown
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Fig. 3 The welfare impacts of climate change with and without a THC shutdown for eight selected
countries. The solid lines denote welfare impacts, the dashed lines temperature change. The scale of
the left y-axis applies to both quantities
In some places, a THC shutdown implies absolute cooling (2). In temperate or
subarctic countries, further cooling has negative impacts (2N). This is the case in
Ireland and Iceland (Fig. 3). In subtropical or tropical countries, cooling has positive
impacts that can be quite substantial in some countries (2P). This is the case in the
Caribbean. Figure 3 shows results for Barbados as an example.
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Fig. 4 The welfare impacts per sector of climate change in 2100 with and without a THC for eight
selected countries
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So far, the emerging pattern has been straightforward. However, in many coun-
tries the development is not as simple. It is often the case that a THC shutdown
has an offsetting effect on a regional warming trend (3). If the impacts of climate
change are negative to start with, one would expect a shift toward the better resulting
from slower warming (3P). This is indeed the case in most countries. Figure 3 shows
Egypt as an example. There are a few exceptions, however, e.g. France, Russia, and
Spain (Fig. 2). The reason is that without a THC shutdown, the decreasing number of
cold-related cardiovascular deaths resulting from warmer conditions contributes sig-
nificantly to positive welfare impacts. With a THC shutdown, this effect disappears,
and the overall impacts become more negative (3N).
If the impacts of climate change are positive without any change in THC strength,
one would expect a worse overall impact as a consequence of slower warming (4).
Again, this is the case in many countries. Figure 3 shows Denmark as an exam-
ple (4N). Here, the positive effect of global warming is not only weakened but
reversed completely as the THC shutdown brings about considerable economic
damages. However, there are exceptions to this development as well, e.g. in Iraq
(Fig. 3). There, a weakening of the THC is actually initially beneficial, but the
positive effect of a collapsed THC disappears over time as the difference in climate-
related economic impacts between the THC shutdown scenario and the control run
diminishes (4P).
Figure 4 shows the impact per sector of a THC shutdown in 2100 for the eight
selected countries. The most important impacts of a THC shutdown are on human
health, energy consumption, and water resources, with economic impacts on ecosys-
tems playing a smaller role. The impact on agriculture is negligible. Also, the impacts
on sea level rise shown represent only part of the actual magnitude as this assessment
disregards the dynamic sea level rise effects of the THC shutdown to start with.
Figure 5 depicts the impact of a change in THC strength aggregated to a global
level by adding dollars without correcting for inequity aversion (Fankhauser et al.
1997, 1998). At this highly aggregate level, the differences seen in Figs. 3 and 4
are obviously hidden. The dominant pattern resembles that of Spain. Climate change
first brings benefits, but the benefits start to decline after 2015, and turn into
damages in 2060. A THC shutdown would bring about additional damages. The gap
Fig. 5 The global welfare
impacts of climate change for
scenarios with no impact on
the thermohaline circulation,
a slowdown, and a shutdown
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between the two scenarios widens rapidly, as the health benefits of warmer climates
disappear. The gap then narrows again as the benefits of slowed warming become
more important at the end of the simulation period.
5 Sensitivity analysis
In the analysis presented above, there are many assumptions about the parameters in
FUND 2.8n, the scenarios that drive the model, and the shutdown of the THC. Some
of these assumptions have little influence on the results. Other assumptions are very
important. In this section, we report sensitivity analyses on the key parameters.
One of the crucial inputs is the assumed climate change due to the shutdown
of the THC. Table 1 shows the 2100 welfare impacts for eight selected countries
for the base scenario (no effect on the THC), the scenario used in Section 4 (THC
shutdown), and a scenario halfway in between (THC slowdown). The eight selected
countries are representative for the variety of responses observed. In a few countries,
such as Spain, a slowdown of the THC has a positive effect, but a shutdown has
a negative effect. In a larger number of countries, such as Denmark and Iceland, a
weakening of the THC to half of its original strength leads to less than half the impact
of a complete shutdown. Figure 5 shows that this pattern dominates at global scale.
Furthermore, unreported experiments show that this impact pattern also holds for a
weaker slowdown of the THC. In other countries, such as Egypt, Gambia, and New
Zealand, the response is approximately linear. There are some countries, such as
Iraq, in which the response is less than linear. In most of those countries, the impact
of a slowdown is positive; and although the overall effect of a shutdown of the THC is
still positive, the positive impacts begin to saturate while the negative impacts start to
escalate. It is therefore no surprise that there are a few countries, such as Barbados,
in which the difference between no change and a slowdown of the THC is positive,
while the difference between slowdown and a shutdown is negative, even though the
difference between no change and a THC shutdown is positive.
Table 2 shows a sensitivity analysis of the parameters that govern the estimated
impacts on water resources, energy consumption, and cardiovascular and respiratory
diseases. If either the sensitivity of water resources to climate change or the income
elasticity is doubled, damages vary only slightly, and the impacts of a THC shutdown
are just a little worse than in the reference scenario.
Table 1 The welfare impact of climate change in 2100 on selected countries for scenarios with no
impact on the thermohaline circulation, a slowdown to 0.5 THCinit, and a complete shutdown
Impact (% GDP) Impact (% GDP) Impact (% GDP)
control scenario THC weakening THC shutdown
1N Gambia −10.94 −11.42 −11.90
1P New Zealand 0.75 0.91 1.07
2N Iceland 0.30 −1.44 −3.65
2P Barbados −1.25 0.22 −0.13
3N Spain −0.62 −0.55 −0.99
3P Egypt −13.27 −8.94 −4.69
4N Denmark 0.04 −1.04 −2.52
4P Iraq 2.34 2.53 2.61
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Table 2 The global welfare losses of climate change in 2100 with and without a THC shutdown for
a range of parameter choices
Impact Impact (% GDP) Difference Change from Change from
(% GDP) THC shutdown (% GDP) Base control Base THC
control scenario scenario (%) shutdown
scenario scenario (%)
Base 1.29 1.39 0.10
Water: 1.31 1.42 0.11 +1.7 +1.7
Sensitivity
Water: Income 1.23 1.35 0.12 −4.5 −3.3
elasticity
Heating: 0.49 0.73 0.24 −61.7 −47.7
Sensitivity
Heating: 0.56 0.96 0.40 −56.3 −31.0
Non-linearity
Heating: 1.59 1.65 0.06 +23.5 +18.2
Income
elasticity
Cooling: 3.48 2.93 −0.55 +170.3 +110.1
Sensitivity
Cooling: 0.23 0.73 0.50 −82.2 −47.7
Non-linearity
Cooling: 0.44 0.80 0.36 −65.7 −42.7
Income
elasticity
Respiratory 1.40 1.39 −0.01 +9.0 −0.1
Cardiovascular, 1.66 1.51 −0.15 +29.1 +8.2
heat
Cardiovascular, 0.54 1.36 0.82 −58.4 −2.3
cold
Urbanization 1.33 1.41 0.08 +3.6 +1.1
Aging 1.21 1.43 0.22 −6.4 +2.7
Value of a 0.72 1.60 0.88 −43.9 +14.9
statistical life
Value of a 1.33 1.43 0.10 +3.7 +2.5
year disabled
A doubling of the sensitivity of heating energy to changes in temperature causes
damages to decrease because savings on heating are beneficial; however, the temper-
ature change due to a THC shutdown becomes more important as the world cools.
If heating were linearly related to temperature, rather than the square root as in the
base scenario, the result would be qualitatively the same. The opposite effects are
observed when the income elasticity is doubled so that future energy use for heating
is smaller. Doubling the sensitivity of cooling energy leads to increased damages both
due to climate change and due to a THC shutdown. If cooling changed linearly with
temperature rather than being proportional to the 1.5th power of temperature as
in the base case, damages would fall in both scenarios. However, the effect is less
pronounced in the scenario with the THC shutdown, so that the difference between
the scenarios increases over time. The same pattern is observed for a doubling of the
income elasticity, which causes energy use for cooling to decrease over time.
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A twofold increase of the sensitivity of heat-related cardiovascular or respiratory
mortality causes climate change impacts to increase (Table 2). A THC shutdown
would have positive effects, as warming is less pronounced. If the sensitivity of cold-
related cardiovascular mortality is doubled, the opposite pattern can be observed.
A doubling of the rate of urbanization leads to higher climate change impacts as the
number of heat-related deaths rises; by the same token, the effect of a THC shutdown
is reduced. A doubling of the rate of aging has the opposite effect, by particularly
increasing cold-related cardiovascular mortality. Doubling the value of a statistical
life reduces the impact of climate change because of the higher weight placed on
the avoided cold-related deaths in the rich and temperate countries. These benefits
disappear with a THC shutdown.
6 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we present estimates of the welfare losses incurred from a rapid shut-
down of the THC. This assessment considers only the temperature effect of such
development. However, there are also considerable impacts of a weaker THC on
other components of the earth’s ocean-atmosphere system, such as altered pre-
cipitation patterns and a significantly augmented background sea level rise. These
developments also have profound socio-economic consequences but are not yet
incorporated in this model. Consequently, the results presented in this paper can
by no means be considered as concrete predictions of welfare impacts of a THC
shutdown on a country level. Instead, they should rather be viewed as an indicator
of the regional heterogeneity of such impacts, in which the emerging patterns and
trends are of greater importance than the actual absolute values. It might very well
be possible that the inclusion of impacts from precipitation and sea level rise effects
would point to trends in welfare impacts that are qualitatively different from the
results shown here.
In some places, a THC shutdown reduces the rate of warming, and this may well
be a benefit. Such is the case in Northern Africa, in which the particularly negative
socioeconomic impacts of global warming are offset to a large degree in case of a
THC shutdown. This effect dominates the result presented in Link and Tol (2004).
However, Link and Tol (2004) ignored the additional warming in some parts of
the world that is here shown to have mostly negative impacts. Furthermore, the
crude spatial resolution of the assessment in Link and Tol (2004) did not allow the
investigation of places where a THC shutdown would not lead to slowed warming
but to an absolute cooling that also increases damages. Finally, at the finer spatial
scale used here, health impacts are modeled in a more realistic way—particularly, a
shutdown of the THC causes a considerable change in cold-related cardiovascular
mortality.
Overall, we find that a complete THC shutdown has a negative effect on welfare;
the same is true, but to a lesser extent, for a partial THC slowdown. The best guess
estimate is −0.1% of global GDP for a THC shutdown by the end of the simulation
period. However, this additional effect is quite small in comparison to the total socio-
economic impact of globally changing climate conditions. In the late 21st century, the
loss in global GDP incurred by a THC shutdown is approximately twice as large as
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the effect on GDP by THC weakening, even though this still amounts to less than
0.5% of global GDP (Fig. 5). Sensitivity analyses of the key parameters of FUND
show estimates in the range of −0.9% GDP to +0.6% GDP. On the national scale
impacts are, of course, in some regions somewhat larger. However, only in very few
countries does the influence of a THC shutdown reach levels that exceed two per cent
of GDP. As expected, this is the case in the Scandinavian countries, Great Britain
and Ireland, and in Canada, the countries most directly affected by the changing
circulation pattern in the vicinity.
Yet, it has to be noted that a scenario that leads to a THC shutdown within the
twenty-first century such as the one used in this paper is rather unlikely to actually
come true. In the 4th IPCC Assessment Report, the probability of such an event is
estimated to be only 5–10% (Meehl et al. 2007). Also, the simulation results indicate
that the magnitude of welfare impacts induced by temperature changes following a
THC shutdown is quite limited compared to the consequences of greenhouse gas
induced warming itself, which suggests that the latter is a much greater danger to
human welfare. This evaluation, however, is likely to be considerably affected if
precipitation and sea level changes following a THC shutdown are considered in the
model as well, which is beyond the scope of the assessment presented here.
Our results are obviously specific to the model and scenario chosen, even though
a model intercomparison of the response of the THC to climate change shows that
the HadCM3 model, on which our THC shutdown scenario is based, is well in line
with other GCMs (Stouffer et al. 2006). However, since the THC shutdown scenario
is moderate over land, other impact models applying this scenario would have to be
very nonlinear to lead to drastically different results than FUND 2.8n.
The assessment with this model version only looks at the overall economic impacts
but does explicitly include economic sectors that are of particular importance for the
North Atlantic region. E.g., fisheries are omitted. While fisheries are only a small
part of the world economy–and therefore do not bias the global results much–they
are particularly important for the economy of those countries that are considerably
affected by a shutdown of the THC. Therefore, their national results are likely to be
biased. Assessments of the development of the Barents Sea cod fishery in scenarios
of global warming with and without a shutdown of the THC show that fisheries
benefit from increased reproductive success and stock growth due to temperature
increases of the cod spawning grounds (Link and Tol 2006, 2009). This positive effect
is offset if the THC breaks down causing the cod fishery to become unprofitable in
the long run. Nonetheless, the overall economic consequences remain rather limited.
Similarly, tourism is omitted. Here, impacts mostly consist of redistribution, so the
global impact would not be affected much; however, with global warming, the cool
countries in the North Atlantic region would become more popular destinations
of summer tourism (Hamilton et al. 2005). This advantage vanishes with a THC
shutdown.
The simplifications made by FUND 2.8n introduce a bias of unknown sign and
size. Our results should therefore be interpreted with the necessary caution. Future
research should address these caveats. Nonetheless, while the total global effect of
temperature changes of a THC shutdown appears to be limited, some national results
are quite substantial. Note that the THC shutdown is the only aspect of climate
change, so far, for which the impacts are larger in rich and temperate countries. The
policy implications arising from this fact are also subject of future research.
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